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IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW*
Daniel H. Joyner**
INTRODUCTION
This essay will provide a discussion and analysis of
international legal questions relating to the dispute between Iran and
Western states with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. In particular, it
will consider the competing interpretations between the parties of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. It then will consider
what this legal analysis means for the future of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The current international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program
began in 2002 when Iranian dissident groups revealed to the IAEA
that Iran had constructed two facilities, at Natanz and Arak, the
existence of which Iran had not reported to the IAEA.1 This
revelation was subsequently confirmed by Iran, though Iran
* This essay was adapted from the transcribed remarks of Professor
Daniel Joyner delivered on February 15, 2013 at the annual symposium of the Penn
State Journal of Law & International Affairs on The U.S.-Iranian Relationship and the
Future of International Order. Video of the symposium is available at
http://law.psu.edu/academics/journals/law_and_international_affairs/lectures_an
d_symposia.
** Daniel H. Joyner, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of
Law.
1 IRAN’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMMES: A NET ASSESSMENT 16
(Gary Samore ed. 2005).
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maintained that no fissile (nuclear) materials had been introduced
into these facilities, and that they were purposed exclusively for
peaceful, civilian use.2
However, Iran’s failure to declare the existence of these
facilities in what the IAEA considered a timely manner led to further
investigations of Iran’s nuclear program3 and to the IAEA’s
determination in November 2003 that, in a number of instances, Iran
had been noncompliant with its legal obligations pursuant to its
INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with
the IAEA.4
The CSA is a bilateral treaty between the IAEA and Iran that
details the legal relationship between the IAEA and Iran and spells
out both Iran’s obligations related to nuclear safeguards and the
IAEA’s authority to conduct investigations and assessments of Iran’s
nuclear facilities and material.5 Specifically, this determination of
noncompliance was based upon the discovery of small amounts of
undeclared uranium and upon Iran’s failure to report the further
processing of this material and the facilities in which it had been
stored.6 In addition, however, the Agency was also concerned about
what it saw as Iran’s “hiding” of the facilities at Natanz and Arak.7
The IAEA Board of Governors (BOG), through a number of
resolutions over the next two years, imposed upon Iran a duty of
2 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Statement by the Iranian Government
and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers (Oct. 21, 2003),
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml.
3 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Bd. of Gov., IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.
4 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran: Resolution adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003, Bd. of Gov., IAEA Doc.
GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26, 2003),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf.
5 IAEA, The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,
IAEA
Doc.
INFCIRC/214
(Dec.
13,
1974),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf.
6 IAEA, supra note 4.
7 See id.
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cooperation with the Agency in order to address these issues of
noncompliance and to satisfactorily answer the IAEA’s remaining
questions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.8 These questions
included whether there were yet further aspects to Iran’s nuclear
program that had not been declared to the IAEA, including possible
military dimensions to the program.9 Iran’s failure to meet this
standard of cooperation to the satisfaction of the IAEA BOG, led to
the Board’s decision in 2006 to refer Iran to the U.N. Security
Council.10
Later that year, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1696, in which it ordered Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to
suspend its uranium enrichment program.11 Iran’s refusal to comply
with the demands of this and subsequent Resolutions adopted by the
Security Council has led to several rounds of economic and financial
sanctions imposed upon Iran by the Security Council.12 Further, both
the United States and the European Union have imposed separate
and additional unilateral economic and financial sanctions on Iran
due to this impasse.13
Since 2002, a number of Iranian civilian nuclear scientists
have been assassinated inside Iran, in what Iran alleges to have been

See IAEA, supra note 5.
See id.
10 Press Release, IAEA, Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme Sent to
U.N.
Security
Council
(Mar.
8,
2006),
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2006/bog080306.html.
11 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Iran
Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August or Face Possible Economic,
Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Press Release SC/8792 (July 31, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm.
12 See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res.
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803 (Mar. 3,
2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). See also Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by
Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian Violations of
International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 533-48 (2007).
13 See Kittrie, supra note 12.
8
9
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targeted killings orchestrated by Israel.14 Further, Iran’s nuclear
facilities have been damaged on multiple occasions by cyberattacks,
including through the introduction of the sophisticated Stuxnet and
Flame computer viruses/worms into these facilities, which Iran
attributes to the United States and Israel.15 While not confirming their
involvement in these events, officials in the United States and Israel
have been variously quoted publicly as supporting potential military
strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities if a diplomatic resolution to the
crisis cannot be reached through negotiations between Iran and the
P5+1 group of states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, China,
France, Germany).16
This discussion analyzes the legal arguments on both sides—
meaning, on the one side, Iran; and on the other side, the U.S.,
Britain, France, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Russia and China,
whom I will collectively (although of course inaccurately) refer to as
“the West” —regarding the relevant sources of international nuclear
law, and regarding whether Iran has been in compliance with these
sources of law. I hope in doing so to flesh out further the nuclear
nonproliferation legal framework.

Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, Who Assassinated an Iranian Nuclear
Scientist?
Israel
Isn’t
Telling,
TIME,
Jan.
13,
2012,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2104372,00.html.
15 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-waveof-cyberattacks-against-iran.html. See also DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND
CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER
(2012).
16 See Bush Won’t Rule Out Military Action Against Iran, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/14/world/fg-iran14; Jon Swaine,
Barack Obama: I’m not bluffing on military action against Iran, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 2, 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/9119775/BarackObama-Im-not-bluffing-on-military-action-against-Iran.html; Alistair Dawber,
Iran’s nuclear ambitions: Israel will not wait until it’s too late, warns Benjamin Netanyahu,
THE INDEPENDENT, July 15, 2013,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/irans-nuclear-ambitionsisrael-will-not-wait-until-its-too-late-warns-benjamin-netanyahu-8709097.html.
14
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THE “WESTERN” ARGUMENTS
The essential Western legal argument is that Iran has been in
the past, and is to this day, in noncompliance with its obligations
under its CSA with the IAEA.17 Again, through IAEA resolutions,
the IAEA BOG has imposed on Iran specific requirements of
cooperation.18 And the Western legal argument is that, because those
levels of cooperation have not been met—meaning access by
inspectors to facilities and Iran’s answering of questions that the
IAEA has—the IAEA BOG continues to determine that Iran is in
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement obligations.19 This in
turn, has led to an argument by some Western officials that Iran is
also in violation of Article III of the NPT, which, in paragraph four,
requires Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) parties to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Thus, there is both the
safeguards agreement compliance level, but also a link in this legal
argument to compliance with Article III of the NPT.20
One legal interpretation underpinning the Western legal
argument regarding Iran’s CSA compliance is regarding the scope of
the authority, or mandate of the IAEA, to investigate and to assess
compliance with CSA. The Western legal argument—and this is the
legal argument also maintained by the IAEA itself—is that the IAEA
has the authority and mandate not only to confirm the correctness of
Iran’s required declaration of its nuclear materials and facilities under
the CSA and the non-diversion of this declared fissile material from
peaceful to military uses, but also the authority and mandate to
confirm the absence of any undeclared nuclear facilities and materials
See IAEA, supra note 4; IAEA, supra note 5; IAEA, Rep. of Dir. Gen.,
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., at paras. 67-71, IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27
(May 22, 2012),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf.
20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
17
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inside Iran, and any potential nuclear weapons-related activity (i.e.,
warhead development activity).
In brief, the INFCIRC/153 CSA, which is the only
safeguards agreement to which Iran is a party, requires a declaration
by the NWWS of their fissile materials accounting and their facilities
relating to those fissile materials.21 The argument of the West and of
the IAEA is that the IAEA not only has the right to, and the
mandate to, confirm the correctness of that declaration, but also its
completeness. This means that the IAEA has the mandate to make
sure that the state has declared everything it was supposed to declare.
That argument has far-reaching implications for the standard of
compliance with the CSA. If one considers that the IAEA’s mandate
is to determine not only the correctness, but also the completeness of
the declaration, the IAEA has the authority, nay, the obligation to
conduct additional inspections to those called for under the
INFCIRC/153 itself, in order to determine, with any confidence, that
there are no undeclared fissile materials. This is the argument of the
West and the IAEA, as to the IAEA’s mandate. And so the argument
goes that, with this standard and the mandate of the IAEA, Iran has
not provided enough cooperation to satisfy suspicions regarding past
and possibly current nuclear weapons-related activity in Iran.22
Under the tenure of Director General Yukiya Amano, the
IAEA has accepted from national intelligence agencies, information
regarding not only Iran’s use of fissile material itself, but also
information concerning the other elements of building a nuclear
weapon, essentially meaning the physical construction of a nuclear
warhead. In November 2011, the Director General of the IAEA
produced a report to the BOG laying out the evidence the IAEA had
obtained from the national intelligence sources, that it argued raised
the specter of Iran having engaged in a number of industrial and

21 See IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and
States Required in Connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Bd.
of
Gov.,
IAEA
Doc.
INFCIRC/153
(June
1972),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf.
22 IAEA, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Interview with Albert Carnesale,
IAEA
Doc.
CFR
Interview
091110
(Nov.
9,
2010),
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/transcripts/2010/cfr091110.html.
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scientific experiments, the understanding from which could be used
in the development of a nuclear warhead.23
This adds yet another dimension to the legal arguments of the
West and the IAEA regarding Iran’s compliance with international
nuclear law—the possibility of an Article II breach of the NPT.24
In summary, the West and the IAEA argue that Iran is in
breach of its CSA obligations, which in turn links to Article III of the
NPT. Second, the West and the IAEA argue that there is a possible
military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program that raises the specter of
an Article II violation of the NPT.
The U.N. Security Council, as I noted, in Resolution 1696
and subsequent resolutions, has commanded Iran to cease uranium
enrichment.25 This then, becomes yet another dimension of
international law relevant to this case—i.e. the legally binding force of
Security Council resolutions under Articles 25 and 103 of the U.N.
Charter.26
IRAN’S RESPONSES AND AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS
Let’s switch now to Iran’s legal arguments, which are
responsive in some respects to the West’s accusations, and in other
respects, rest on independent assertions Iran’s legal arguments are
essentially based in Article IV of the NPT—the inalienable right of
all states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.27 I wrote a book,
published in 2011, probably half of which is devoted to interpretation
of Article IV and Article III and this whole question of the
inalienable right.28 I will only mention here that we need not think of
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions
of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rep. of Dir. Gen., IAEA
Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf.
24 See NPT, supra note 20, at art. II.
25 S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
26 U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.
27 NPT, supra note 20, at art. IV.
28 DANIEL
H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (2011).
23
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the right to the full nuclear fuel cycle as residing only in the NPT.
Under the Lotus principle of international law, according to which,
essentially, that which is not prohibited by law is lawful, the real
question is: are the activities related to the fuel nuclear cycle
prohibited anywhere in international law?29 And the answer to this is
no, except in very specific ways in the context of Article II of the
NPT, and to some extent, Article III and the safeguards requirement
of the IAEA. So that’s an important change of vision to look at it
that way. A right need not exist under the NPT. Instead, the proper
determination would be whether any activities are prohibited in
international law, and if they are not, then they are lawful. Thus, Iran
argues, its NPT Article IV right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy
provides the essential starting point for legal analysis.30
Iran specifically disputes the argument by the West and the
IAEA that Iran is in noncompliance with its IAEA CSA on a number
of bases. One is the question of the mandate of the IAEA. Iran, in
viewing the INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement,
sees the mandate of the IAEA spelled out very clearly in Article II,
and that is to detect the diversion of fissile materials from peaceful to
military uses.31 It essentially argues that the framework provided by
the CSA, is that detecting diversion of fissile material is to be
accomplished through a declaration by the State Party of its fissile
materials and facilities, and then the IAEA’s determination of the
accuracy of that declaration.32 Iran argues that anything beyond that –
including the imposition of a higher level of cooperation than that
contained in the CSA; or the idea that the IAEA has a mandate not
only to determine the accuracy but also the completeness of Iran’s
declaration—is ultra vires the IAEA’s authority under the CSA.33

See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10,
http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/SS%20Lotus%20%20PCIJ%20-%201927.pdf.
30 H.E. Ambassador A.A. Soltanieh, Statement to the Second Session of
the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Apr. 23, 2013),
at
4,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/npt/prepcom13/statements/23April_Iran.pdf.
31 See id. at 4-5.
32 See id. at 3.
33 See id.
29
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Essentially, Iran argues that if the IAEA is accorded the
mandate of determining not only the accuracy but also the
completeness of a declaration, then a NPT NNWS would be required
to prove the negative—i.e. to prove that Iran does not have
undeclared fissile materials; to prove that Iran has never engaged in
possible military dimensions; and to prove that it is logically
impossible for Iran to do so.34 How can one prove that one has not
done something? It is a basic principle of logic - that you cannot
prove the negative. It is a never-ending game that produces only time
and argument. Based on this point, Iran argues that it is in
compliance with its IAEA CSA.
In response to the possible military dimensions legal angle,
Iran argues that, again, under the CSA, there is no mandate for the
IAEA to investigate or to assess potential nuclear weapons-related
work not directly relating to diversion of fissile material from
peaceful to military uses. Furthermore, with regard to NPT Article II,
they argue that the NPT does not prohibit research, design, or
industrial capabilities that could be used to make a nuclear warhead,
but that could be used for other things as well. They point to Japan,
in particular, as a state that has every industrial and technical
capability to build a nuclear weapon, and thus has every capability
outlined in the November 2011 IAEA report on Implementation of
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. And yet, there have been no arguments
by the West or the IAEA that Japan is in noncompliance with its
safeguards agreement or in violation of the NPT. In summary, Iran
argues that it is in compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
Even if it were not in compliance, there would be no NPT Article III
breach.
Iran further argues that there is certainly no Article II breach
of the NPT. Iran has not manufactured or otherwise acquired nuclear
weapons, and, in fact, the IAEA has no mandate to investigate or
assess that question.
Iran is essentially correct in its legal arguments regarding NPT
interpretation and interpretation of the IAEA’s authority and
mandate under its statute and its CSA with Iran. According to the
34

Id.
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correct legal interpretation, Iran is in compliance both with the NPT
and with its CSA with the IAEA.
WHAT THE IRAN CASE MEANS FOR THE
FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME
Finally, what does the Iran case mean for the future of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime? Iran’s case illustrates warped and
incorrect legal interpretations of the NPT and of IAEA sources of
law and a prejudicial and inconsistent application of the law to this
case by the West and by the IAEA itself.
From the macro view, the Iranian case is illustrative of the
longstanding and varied policies and practices of the U.S. and its
allies, which have fundamentally undermined the NPT legal regime.
The NPT was and is a quid pro quo grand bargain between nuclearweapon states and developing NNWS. As the developing NNWS,
including but not limited to Iran, feel that the powerful nuclearweapon states simply disregard their own obligations under the
NPT,35 disregard the grand bargain with regard to non-NPT parties,36
and, furthermore, prejudicially and incorrectly use NNWS obligations
against them to their harm,37 the treaty regime will fade into further
perceived illegitimacy and, ultimately, irrelevance.
The future of the NPT as the normative cornerstone of
international law’s regulation of nuclear energy is unfortunately bleak.
The one most significant reason for this is the warped and prejudicial
manner in which the West has generally interpreted and sought to
apply the law of the NPT to non-nuclear-weapon states, including
Iran. The time has come for a new grand bargain—one that
Here, I’m referring specifically to Article VI on disarmament.
See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123
Agreement),
Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
Aug.
2007,
http://www.cfr.org/india/agreement-cooperation-between-government-unitedstates-america-government-india-concerning-peaceful-uses-nuclear-energy-123agreement/p15459 (discussing the nuclear sharing deal between the U.S. and
India).
37 Here is where I would locate the Iran case, such that its leaders no
longer feel they are getting the benefit of the grand bargain.
35
36
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progresses the aim of global nuclear disarmament, as well as
strengthens the legal framework governing nonproliferation, while at
the same time ensuring that civilian nuclear energy programs may be
freely pursued and developed by states that choose to do so.
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